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February 24, 1994 
I. Introduction 
Our 30 lawyer firm has been engaged, exclusively, in the 
representation of labor unions and related benefit funds, for 
more than 50 years. I don't go back all that far. I joined what 
was then Cohen & Weiss in 1960. 
We represent a broad range of International and Local 
Unions, arraigned across the labor market. This affords us an 
instructive variety of experiences in this morning's topic — 
representation process and the law. 
For example, we are general counsel to the National 
Association of Letter Carriers, (AFL-CIO) which represents all 
230,000 letter carriers employed in every hamlet, town and City 
in the country. Postal Service labor relations are governed by 
the Postal Reorganization Act, which replicates the National 
Labor Relations Act — with two major differences: There is no 
right to strike, and there is mandatory interest arbitration in 
the event direct collective bargaining fails to produce an 
agreement. There is also no "union shop" provision. The Postal 
Service's work force in many ways mirrors the nation's workforce 
in basic demographics (age, sex, race), and comes from all areas 
of the country including those thought disinclined towards 
unionism. The NALC, moreover, has a dues structure comparable to 
many other unions (two hours pay, per month). And, 92% of 
eligible workers belong to the union on a purely voluntary basis. 
We also are General Counsel to the Air Line Pilots 
Association, (AFL-CIO) which represents over 35,000 of the 
nation's airline pilots. It is difficult to conceive of a more 
highly educated, high tech, workforce. The popular perception is 
that such a group is not a high yield union member constituency. 
Yet, virtually all of the nation's pilots are unionized. Indeed, 
a very high percentage of all workers in the airline industry, 
and on the railroads, are unionized. The airline industry, as 
you know, is governed by the Railway Labor Act. It is 
interesting in that regard that neither the unions covered by the 
RLA nor the employers have recommended any legislative changes to 
that Act. 
The harsh reality our clients face under the National Labor 
Relations Act is in sharp contrast to our experience in the 
public sector and under the Railway Labor Act. Here, we act as 
General Counsel to the American Federation of Television and 
Radio Artists (AFTRA), and as Special Counsel to the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the United Steelworkers 
of America, and the United Auto Workers (all, AFL-CIO). Perhaps 
most significantly (because it is where most of the organizing is 
attempted) we represent approximately 15 local unions (ranging in 
size from a few hundred to tens of thousands), in a wide variety 
of industries. 
You have heard many individual accounts of the extraordinary 
roadblocks placed in the way of NLRA organizing efforts. Do not 
dismiss them as anecdotal — or as merely the inevitable, but not 
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truly representative, "worst cases " of any complex system. In 
fact, they represent the day-in, day-out reality. As employers 
see that vitriolic, intimidating, no-holds-barred anti-union 
campaigns work in maintaining their company's "union free" 
policy, a Gresham's law of union-resisting efforts has taken over 
— with the worst employer tactics pushing others out of the 
market. 
II. The current legal structure no longer supports the 
basic social compact which underlies our national labor policy. 
I begin with the perhaps audacious assumption that this 
Commission will conclude that the social compact embodied in the 
law — specifically the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Wagner Act and 
the RLA — remains the bedrock of this nation's labor-management 
policy: that workers, free from employer coercion, should be able 
to select a union to represent them in bargaining collectively 
with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment; 
that workers' right to withhold labor is a basic human right to 
be safeguarded as the workers' ultimate protection when all else 
fails to produce a "bargain" in a free market economy. 
I make that initial assumption because, candidly, if you 
have not come to that conclusion, or if you have not had it 
reinforced, by this point in your exploration, I doubt that this 
union lawyer is going to bring you to an epiphany. 
I make one further assumption — that you will conclude that 
the legal system for protecting these worker rights has proved to 
be inadequate to the task and that employers have taken advantage 
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of these inadequacies to breach this social compact. 
Specifically, the law has not — and is not — affording a 
significant number of workers the free uncoerced opportunity to 
assert their rights to effective union representation. 
I am a little more hesitant in making this assumption, 
because of the drumbeat rhetoric you have heard about the short-
comings and limitations of trade unionism and the supposed 
antipathy of today's supposedly satisfied, empowered, new-age 
work force, toward neanderthal labor unions. However, I believe 
that even those of you who may, in some small dark corner of your 
souls, harbor similar doubts, will have the objectivity to 
recognize that it is the workers, themselves, whose judgment on 
those issues must be respected and protected. 
For those who believe that, in fact, unions are no longer 
relevant to the American workforce, a fair mechanism to permit 
workers to exercise their own judgment should be no threat. It 
is no answer to the charge that employer coercion effectively 
chills union organizing efforts that union efforts would fail 
anyway. Obviously the labor movement believes the contrary. 
And, overall, unions, I believe, are prepared to run the risk 
that they are wrong. The basic point is that they want a fair 
opportunity to show that they are right. 
If my two basic assumptions are correct, the task remains to 
develop an analytic framework to measure the utility of the 
available options. 
I understand this is the fact finding portion of your 
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undertaking, and that specific recommendations are not the order 
of the day. But since it is likely that the articulation of your 
findings of facts inevitably will shape the nature of your 
recommendations, let me push the envelop just a bit. 
I urge you not to fixate on the specific worst case stories 
that have — quite properly — been brought to your attention-to 
get your attention. It would be easy — but manifestly inadequate 
— to express deep sympathy for the victims of especially 
outrageous cases of employer coercion, but conclude that all that 
is necessary is to tweak the remedial sections of the law to 
punish future malefactors sufficiently to dissuade the harshest 
predatory activities. 
I urge you, rather, to probe beneath the surface 
symptomology and analyze the underlying systemic issues. First, 
consider the extent to which, if at all, the employer has any 
right to interfere with the exercise by employees of their right 
to determine whether to have collective representation. Second, 
consider the extent to which aspects of the substantive labor law 
other than those that directly regulate organizing are inherently 
coercive of employees rights, including the right to organize; 
thirdly, reflect on whether the current employer power/coercion 
relationship with employees is not diametrically opposed to the 
modern concept of jointness deemed essential to globally 
competitive productivity and quality standards. 
Let's start with the propriety of an employer's interference 
in an employee's right to determine whether to be represented by 
6 
a union. Have I improperly skewed the issue by speaking in terms 
of "interference"? I think not. Let us reflect on the 
respective interests of the employer and the employee in the 
making of the employee's decision whether or not to make common 
cause with fellow employees. 
We do not start with a clean state. The Wagner Act was an 
attempt to effect a sea-change in the traditional view of the 
employer-worker relationship. It embodies the realization that, 
notwithstanding the mythology of the perfect labor market (where 
every hiring in theory is the product of an individual bargain 
between a mobile, informed individual worker and an employer), 
reality is very different. The hoary common law labels revealed 
that which the free market myth masked: that the functioning (as 
opposed to theoretical) labor market is based upon a master-
servant relationship, grounded in the master's superior economic 
power and protected by law. A frank recognition of the 
inequality of the parties' bargaining power is the very essence 
of the master-servant relationship. It was precisely that 
imbalance and inequality that the social compact addressed. 
Why should the employer — the other side of the bargaining 
relationship (whether with an individual or a collective 
representative) — have any legitimate interest in determining 
the outcome of the individual workers' choice of how to organize 
their side of the relationship. 
The argument is made that the employer brings the "full 
story" to the employees attention. In whose interest is the 
employer acting in such an exercise? Is it some "paternal 
interest" the master has in enhancing the economic, or other, 
interests of the servant? Of course not. This is not a fairy 
tale. Obviously, the employer acts in its own interest. But it 
is not the employer's interest which the social compact sought to 
protect. Precisely to the contrary. 
It is also argued that even if there is no legitimate 
employer interest which needs legal protection, employers should 
be able to make the "anti-union case" because workers have a 
right to hear it, and employers have the capacity and resources 
to make it. 
This argument is doubly flawed. The underlying assumption 
is that American workers are naifs, simplistic wards in need of 
paternalistic guidance. Nonsense. Today's workers do not live 
in an information vacuum. The vigorous public debate on the 
relative merits and demerits, strengths and weaknesses, of 
unionism and individual action has not taken place under a 
barrel. This is a communication/information-driven era. Workers 
today are sophisticated. The notion that they "need" their 
employer to bring this essential information to their previously 
sheltered, unaware state, is beyond the cynical — it is 
insulting. 
Quite aside from that, experience has demonstrated that the 
typical employer anti-union campaign is an exercise in 
illegitimate power not in legitimate communication: The aim is 
not to produce an "enlightened worker," but to produce a 
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frightened worker. In the real world of organizing, the risk 
that some workers somewhere are so abysmally ignorant that some 
altruistic employers might actually perform an educational role, 
is far outweighed by the repeatedly demonstrated employer 
proclivity to frighten and coerce. 
Next, I would like to explore another reality of today's 
workplace environment — the power that an employer has to 
instill fear in workers is not just a product of relative 
economic strength. It is very much a function of a set of legal 
rules which enhance that economic power. Take, for example, the 
employment-at-will doctrine; the First National Maintenance case 
and its implications; and the doctrines that allow employers to 
control where and by whom this work will be performed. All of 
these proceed from the basic underlying assumption that labor is 
a commodity; that a master-servant relationship is the proper 
order of things. 
Is it any wonder that an employee, repeatedly reminded that 
his employment is largely at the whim of his employer — and that 
the continued existence of the employing entity is essentially 
within the unilateral control of the employer, with or without a 
union — is going to approach a union organizing campaign 
hesitantly? 
I recognize that it is not likely, at least in the short 
run, to expect revolutionary changes in the basic legal framework 
that permits employers — union and non-union — unilaterally to 
control the economic life and death of their employees. But 
precisely because that is the case, it is even more important 
that employers not have the additional power to pretermit 
employee decisions to exercise that measure of influence as the 
law provides over their terms and conditions of employment. 
Finally, I suggest that there is a broad, long-term 
national interest in restructuring the system of determining 
union representational status to discourage — rather than 
encourage — the harsh, bitter, divisive aspects of the employer 
anti-union campaign. 
Some emerging truths seem unassailable — Taylorism is an 
anachronism; autocratic management is inefficient; a highly 
motivated, thoroughly trained, fully empowered workforce is the 
key to increased productivity. 
Is it not crystal-clear that continuation of class warfare 
where employees seek to organize is inconsistent with those 
goals? 
Is it not contrary to the public good for union organizing 
campaigns to be contests over whether a system that provides 
employees a voice and a measure of independent power is 
legitimate, with the employer using his economic power to 
forestall the adoption of such a system. 
Conclusion 
If, as I believe (and I believe you believe) collective 
bargaining is worth preserving; 
If, as I believe (and I believe you believe) the current 
state of our legal system permits employers to misuse their 
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inherent economic power to coerce employees in the exercise of 
the employees' rights to self-determination regarding collective 
representation; 
Then the initial question before you is whether a mere 
tinkering with the system — tightening time schedules here, 
increasing penalties there, addressing the "worst case" excesses 
alone — will be sufficient. I respectfully urge upon you the 
proposition that the answer is "no." 
As a society, we must own up to the reality that our basic 
legal framework for determining the free choice of employees 
whether or not to organize is fundamentally flawed. It fails to 
confront the power/coercion/fear syndrome inherent in protection 
of an employer's involvement in the exercise by employees of 
employee rights. 
